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Till and Bell: Churchill and Seapower

In his farewell address to the nation
in January 1961, Eisenhower advised government to “guard against
the unwarranted influences, whether
sought or unsought, by the militaryindustrial complex.” Koistinen analyzes
Ike’s caution and considers the evolution and development of the MIC.
Koistinen does not argue that the MIC
created itself or was constructed with
intent in some coordinated or collaborative effort led by the government. He,
however, does state that U.S. foreign
policy and national security requirements led to its development and that
the MIC’s pervasive influence in government, economics, and society is the result of numerous mutual and supporting
interests of government and nongovernment institutions and organizations.
The author evaluates what he describes
as the “noncompetitive” defense industry as an economic sector within the
U.S. domestic economy, considering
fundamental economic principles. This
government-constructed defense sector
operates free of the market pressures of
supply and demand; prices, accordingly,
result from the contracting processes between the military services and contractors. The conditions of the defense sector rarely stimulate competition, owing
to numerous mergers among a decreasing number of defense corporations.
Today, the U.S. defense budget remains large, yet insufficient to meet
the requirements placed on the military. Koistinen observes that the MIC
continues to produce high-technology
weapons at high cost. The cost of these
weapons results in smaller quantities,
a fact that results in a force structure
that is insufficient to meet the requirements of the national strategy.
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The author concludes that over time the
MIC has become so entrenched in the
economic, political, and social lives of
the nation that today it is nearly impossible to diminish its influence. This book
presents a compelling explanation of the
effects on the U.S. economy of government and private-sector actions of recent
decades regarding the development of
the current national-security system.
Sean Sullivan

Naval War College

Bell, Christopher M. Churchill and Seapower.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013. 429pp.
$34.95

Although Winston Churchill is still regarded as one of the great British leaders
of the twentieth century, he continues to
attract not only praise but a large measure of criticism. This book is a valuable
addition to a formidable library of such
analysis. As its title tells us, this is a
review of Churchill’s thinking about sea
power in general and British sea power
in particular. Its central theme is nicely
encapsulated by a famous remark made
about Churchill by General Sir Alan
Brooke, arguably one of Britain’s most
famous and successful soldiers during
the Second World War: “A complete
amateur of strategy, he swamps himself
in detail he should never look at and
as a result fails ever to see a strategic
problem in its true perspective.”
However, Christopher Bell asks, is this
kind of criticism, from a number of
scholars, any more justified than the
uncritical adulation Churchill usually receives? Where does the truth
lie in this spectrum of possible reactions to Churchill as naval strategist?
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Bell, an established and well respected
historian of the twentieth-century Royal
Navy, explores the subject by a balanced
and stimulating chronological review of
Churchill’s direct and indirect association with the Royal Navy from before
the First World War to the end of the
Second. Churchill generally emerges
quite well, in much better shape than his
detractors would lead us to expect. But
this is no hagiography. Churchill’s limitations, mistakes, and misperceptions
are pointed out as well as his achievements. Bell shows Churchill to have
been realistic and pragmatic about naval
construction in the period before the
First World War; not wholly and solely
to blame for the disastrous outcome of
the Dardanelles campaign of 1915; and
capable of recognizing, even in political exile, that the battle of Jutland had
been in fact a strategic victory for the
British. In the First World War, and
indeed the Second as well, Churchill
was an “ideas man” who continually
pushed for offensive schemes, running
up against the staid and conservative counsels of his service chiefs.
His was one voice, but there were many
others. Occasionally too, his ideas now
seem extraordinarily ill judged (most
obviously that of sending a “surplus”
fleet into the Baltic to attack the German
coast without defeating the German fleet
and air force first). Normally, though,
Bell shows that there was sense in what
he said, and certainly his restless pursuit
of action that could help bring victory
was a necessary, though sometimes
much resented, goad to his military men.
Many were less than happy with his infatuation with, and pretended expertise
in, military technology. “Machines save
life,” he said in 1917; “machine-power
is a substitute for manpower.” Hence
his enthusiasm for the airpower in the
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First World War, an enthusiasm that,
when allied to his push for offensive
action, led to the British strategic
bombing offensive of the Second World
War but also the relative neglect of the
all-important Battle of the Atlantic.
This is rich fare. Many of Churchill’s
conceptions of sea power are thoroughly
and sensibly considered in this book,
which deserves to be read not just because it is about Churchill but also for its
secondary topic (which the author could
well have better developed)—the balance
struck between the military and its
political masters in the direction of war.
To what extent should civilian leaders
like Churchill “interfere” in the planning and conduct of military operations when their motivations are more
operational than political or diplomatic?
It was on this very point that Churchill’s
service chiefs really had objections
during the war. Churchill insisted that
his operational ideas about what the
Royal Navy could and should be doing
were good enough to be taken seriously, even if not accepted in the end by
professional sailors. Christopher Bell
shows us that in the main they were
taken seriously, and deservedly so.
Geoffrey Till

King’s College London

Scott, James. The War Below: The Story of Three
Submarines That Battled Japan. New York: Simon
& Schuster, 2013. 420 pp. $28

The War Below is a remarkable historical
analysis of submarine warfare in the Pacific during World War II. It interweaves
stories of submariners (especially their
skippers) with comprehensive description of naval warfare from Pearl Harbor
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